BEHAVIORAL FACTORS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT FOR EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION EXERCISE DECISIONS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24034/j25485024.y2009.v13.i3.384Keywords:
Program Opsi Saham Karyawan, Eksekusi, Nilai Opsi Saham, Desain Kompensasi, Pengukuran KinerjaAbstract
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menguji faktor-faktor keperilakuan eksekutif atas perilaku pengelolaan laba berkaitan dengan program penawaran opsi saham eksekutif pada perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Konsisten dengan Heath dan Huddart (1998) bahwa eksekusi terhadap opsi saham eksekutif merupakan respon terhadap pergerakan harga saham. Penelitian ini mengirim 75 kuesioner dan kembali sebanyak 52, tetapi 2 kuesioner tidak menjawab secara lengkap dan dikeluarkan sebagai sampel, sehingga sampel akhir sebanyak 50. Analisis data menggunakan regresi berganda terdiri atas 3 (tiga) variabel indepeden dan 1 variabel dependen. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa nilai opsi saham dan desain kompensasi menjadi faktor yang dipertimbangkan manajer untuk melakukan pengelolaan laba, namun tidak demikian untuk faktor pengukuran kinerja. Semakin besar nilai kompensasi yang diterima, semakin besar kemungkinan manajer melakukan pengelolaan laba. Sebagai tambahan, kompensasi jangka panjang menunjukkan desain penghargaan kepada para eksekutif yang memiliki kemampuan dan loyalitas yang tinggi, sehingga mengikat untuk jangka waktu panjang melalui opsi saham eksekutif. Hal tersebut semakin memotivasi eksekutif untuk meningkatkan kinerja mereka melalui pengelolan laba karena untung diperoleh dari perbedaan antara harga pasar pada saat jatuh tempo dengan harga eksekusi pada tanggal hibah.
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